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Abstract: This paper focuses on regional integration through the lenses of the Water–Food–Energy (WEF)
nexus, a concept putting strong emphasis on cross-sectoral and multi-level interactions as well as on
resource interdependencies. There is an extensive amount of published research focusing on the Aral Sea
basin. In this paper, the authors build upon these different contributions and provide a meta-analysis
of the literature of WEF nexus opportunities in Central Asia (CA) countries. This paper contributes
to ongoing discussions regarding how the WEF Nexus can represent an opportunity for reinforced
collaboration regarding resources management. To do so, focusing on existing literature, this paper first
(1) explores how the nexus can be a relevant instrument for regional integration. Second (2), it provides
an overview of water, food, energy conditions and challenges in the Aral Sea basin in particular. Third (3),
synthesizing existing research, the authors identify critical variables to be considered as hurdles or
leverage points for WEF nexus implementation in the Aral Sea basin. Finally (4), we go back to our initial
set of questions and identify some possible avenues for future research.
Keywords: water–energy–food nexus; Aral Sea; water resource management; regional integration;
Central Asia
1. Introduction
Central Asia (CA) is a young integrated region after the collapse of Soviet Union in the 1990s.
Its population is over 70 million, while having rich mineral resources to cover energy demand.
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have long-lasting coal, oil resources that are now used for electricity generation
intensively. Most of the energy infrastructure has been established during the Soviet period [1]. It is
appropriate to say that the traditional energy system faces huge inefficiency and technical losses due to the
old infrastructure established in the 1960s.
To overcome the losses and inefficiency, CA economies are considering finding sustainable energy
solutions. In upstream countries, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, water is a key supplier of energy,
while it is important for downstream countries as a source of agriculture [2]. Thus, water plays an important
role in the provision of energy solutions in Central Asia.
Back in the 1960s, the Soviet Union decided to transform the Karakum and Kyzylkum deserts of
Central Asia into cotton plantations via directing the flow of Amudarya and Syrdarya rivers that were
flowing into the Aral Sea, which was the 4th largest lake in the world [3]. This decision resulted in a
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significant human-made mistake that led the Aral Sea drying out completely. Logically, cotton plantations
do not occur in the desert area regardless of how much water one feeds in.
Iconic images of the dried Aral Sea show particularly well the environmental tragedy that the region
suffers for the last decades [4]. Mainly fed by the Amu Darya and Syr Darya rivers, the sea levels declined
massively since the sixties along with the diverting of these rivers to supply irrigation schemes and to
boost agricultural production (mainly cotton) in the Karakum and Kyzylkym deserts [5]. These massive
environmental changes in the region result from the misplaced policies that were undertaken between the
sixties and the nineties.
On the one hand, during Soviet time, the management of natural resources depended on a planned
strategy led at the Soviet Union level called the “Aral Sea Plan”, a massive irrigation scheme aiming to
transform the region into an agricultural belt focusing on cotton production. The objective was to double the
agricultural production capacities of the region [6]. This irrigation scheme was supported by the two rivers
(Amu Darya and Syr Darya) and benefited from strong upstream–downstream coordination including
shared energy production capacities. At that time, the system was depending on complementarities among
countries with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan ensuring the supply of water and the other countries focusing on
irrigation and hydrocarbon production [7–9].
On the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early nineties and the independence of the
five countries in the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) deeply
modified the collaboration schemes and dismantled the regional integration of Central Asia. In fact,
uncoordinated competition among the five countries and the will of the new independent countries to
reach self-sufficiency, energy and food security increased water intakes and, consecutively, led to the
drying of the Aral Sea. For instance, 90% of the Aral Sea basin water flows are currently withdrawn for
irrigation purposes [10].
Considering this context of strong interdependences between the basin‘s countries regarding the
functioning of irrigation schemes in semi-arid areas and food and energy security, the stakes are particularly
high [11]. This fact is reinforced by climate changes in the region that exacerbate an already difficult
situation and become an important source for international tensions [12]. Such context implies an increase
of complexity in a region characterized by already difficult trade-offs for resource allocation and for
the provision of arbitrations by countries that are not at ways sufficiently equipped with financial and
institutional capacities to deal with such challenges.
Regional integration and collaboration is needed urgently to promote a more efficient use of water
for energy and food production and to address environmental problems related to the overuse of water
resources [3]. The challenge here is to rebuild an efficient and sustainable regional integration in the
framework of diverging national interests and long-standing political tensions, including a lack of
upstream–downstream coordination.
In this regard, this chapter focuses on such regional integration through the lenses of the
Water–Food–Energy (WEF) nexus [1], a concept putting strong emphasis on cross-sectoral and multi-level
interactions as well as on resource interdependencies [13]. An extensive amount of published research
focuses on the Aral Sea basin. In this paper, the authors build upon these different contributions and
provide a meta-analysis of the literature of WEF nexus opportunities in CA countries. As other authors,
we underline the synergy opportunities of the WEF nexus conceptual framework to identify possible
benefit-sharing mechanisms, to ensure equitable resources management across diverse institutional levels
and sectors of activity in a transboundary setting [14,15]. This is particularly the case in a region where
resource endowments vary widely among the different countries [16].
We therefore ask the following set of research questions: (i) What are the key dimensions of the WEF
Nexus that are considered as critical by the literature? (ii) To what extent a water–energy–nexus-based
conceptual framework may be used as an entry point for reinforced collaboration and regional integration?
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(iii) What would be the key elements needed to operationalize the proposed water-energy nexus framework
in the Aral Sea basin?
This paper contributes to ongoing discussions [2–4] regarding how the WEF Nexus can represent an
opportunity for reinforced collaboration regarding resources management. To do so, focusing on existing
literature, this paper first (1) explores how the WEF nexus can be a relevant instrument for transboundary
collaboration. Second (2), it provides an overview of water, food, energy conditions and challenges in the
Aral Sea basin in particular. Third (3), synthesizing existing research, authors identify critical variables to be
considered as hurdles or leverage points for WEF nexus implementation in the Aral Sea basin. Finally (4),
we go back to our initial set of questions and identify some possible avenues for future research.
2. Added Values of the WEF Nexus Approach for Transboundary Collaboration
WEF nexus narratives [1,17] are articulated around the idea that described challenges of water,
energy and food security in complex institutional and environmental settings require new ways of thinking
and flexible forms of governance [18] as well as innovation in all policy dimensions. In this regard,
sustainable access to and management of resources is a necessary condition for long-term economic growth
and development [19]. Understanding complex intersectoral and multiscalar linkages and improving nexus
efficiency could mean a major win-win outcome for the wellbeing of a concerned population [20]. As a
matter of fact, as underlined by different authors [18,21], the WEF nexus approach gained traction in the past
few years. As an illustration, we can observe only seven papers on Google Scholar search for “water energy
food nexus” in 2011 while the quantity of papers reached 3350 occurrences in 2019. Two reasons can be
considered as key drivers for an increased scientific attention on the WEF Nexus globally [22]. Firstly,
the global community has rising perception on the economic risks of the nexus. Secondly, science is using the
nexus as a new structure for international policy debate about the connection between resource usage and
sustainable development. The WEF nexus approach can be a relevant instrument for transboundary contexts
in particular [9]. It can indeed generate new approaches to intersectoral and multi-level collaborations
and open the discussion towards new pathways of collaboration among involved countries, considering
a broader framing of stakes at play and of existing causal relationships and trade-offs. The authors [23]
underline that WEF nexus dimensions are strongly context specific. In the case of Central Asia, one can
observe strong inequalities regarding resource allocation and a natural division of labor between upstream
and downstream countries leaving room for reinforced regional integration. For instance, the management
of critical infrastructures such as dams can, if no coordination takes place, have knock on effects on food
and energy security. Coordination is key and the WEF nexus framework has the potential to complement
existing approaches for the management of transboundary river basins [22].
A core issue of the water–energy–food nexus is the trade-off between water-dependent activities.
Accordingly [23], the current nexus situation in the ASB (Aral Sea basin) is a high-profile example of
the increasing human water use and diminishing environmental water. Reduced lake areas, increased
salinity, a loss of fish species, desertification, dust storms, and climate change along the shoreline are all
consequences of irrigation expansion and reduced inflows. The ecological change brought the collapse of
the fishing industry, high unemployment, the loss of irrigated land to salinization, poorer diets and health
problems [6].
Aral Sea basin countries annually consume 116 km3 of water, where 78 km3 originates from Amu
Darya (Table 1) which is twice as large as the contribution of Syr Darya (37 km3). Respectfully, 70% of
Amu Darya and Syr Darya originate in the mountains of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan [24].
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Table 1. Country areas in the Aral Sea basin [10].
Basin
Area
Countries
Area of Country
in Basin (km2)
As of Total Area
of the Basin
As of % of Total
Area of the Countrykm2 % of Central Asia
Syr Darya 531,650 11%
Kazakhstan 345,000 64.9 12.7
Kyrgyzstan 110,570 20.8 55.3
Tajikistan 15,680 2.9 11
Uzbekistan 60,400 11.4 13.5
Amu Darya 1,023,610 22%
Afghanistan 166,000 16.2 25.4
Kyrgyzstan 7800 0.8 3.9
Tajikistan 125,450 12.3 88.0
Turkmenistan 359,730 35.1 73.7
Uzbekistan 364,630 35.6 81.5
Tedzhen-Murghab 182,010 4%
Afghanistan 80,000 44 12.3
Turkmenistan 102,010 56 20.9
Aral Sea basin 1,737,270 37%
Afghanistan 246,000 14.2 37.7
Kazakhstan 345,000 19.9 12.7
Kyrgyzstan 118,370 6.8 59.2
Tajikistan 141,130 8.1 99.0
Turkmenistan 461,740 26.6 94.6
Uzbekistan 425,030 24.5 95
Considering water consumption in the region (Figure 1), Uzbekistan is the biggest water consumer
(56 km3) in the region, while the water usage per capita is the highest in Turkmenistan (5952 m3/year)
whereas agriculture remains still the dominant consuming sector in Central Asia [25].
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The region is well know for its extrem continental climate, reaching up to 49.8 ◦C in summertime,
where water evaporation mounts t 1700 m /y [26]. Interconnections among agriculture, energy and
w ter are important to understand when they are explained in monetary valu s.
Table 2 shows the pivotal role played by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia regarding
hydropower production with, t the same time, minimal electricity and water co sumption per capita.
On their turn, downstream countries Uzbekistan and Turk enistan have the highest agriculture potential
leading to consuming most f the w ter fr m Amu Darya.
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Table 2. Key water–energy–food parameters in the Aral Sea basin [27].
Country GDP (USDBillion), 2017
Agriculture Value
Added to GDP, 2015
Annual Water Use
(Million m3/Year)
Electric Power Consumption
(kWh Per Capita), 2014
Electricity Production from
Hydroelectric Sources (% of Total), 2015
Kazakhstan 162.8 4.7% 21,143 5600 8.7
Kyrgyz
Republic 7.5 14.1% 8007 1941 85.2
Tajikistan 7.1 21.9% 11,496 1480 98.5
Turkmenistan 37.9 9.3% 27,958 2679 0.0
Uzbekistan 49.6 16.7% 56,000 1645 20.7
3. The Situation in Amu Darya River Basin
Since agriculture and fossil fuel export are key indicators of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, it leads to
the perception that the more the country consumes water, the smaller the tendency to generate electricity
from hydro resources. However, small/mini hydro plants are possible to install to cover the energy needs in
a decentralized way. On its turn, it leads to economizing the fossil fuel of downstream countries. However,
only a 4.7%-small fraction of Kazakhstan’s GDP is generated in the agriculture sector while Uzbekistan’s
parameter is 16.7%.
It is noteworthy that more than half of the region’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) directly comes from
agriculture, which also employs 40% of its labor [11]. The main reason behind high-water consumption in
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is related to high irrigation practices, mainly for cotton (Table 3). From the
point of yield, the highest cotton productivity belongs to Uzbekistan (2.3 ton/ha) and Turkmenistan
(2.2 ton/ha) with proportional high-water consumption (14 m3/ha/year). Dependence on agriculture is the
lowest in Tajikistan (0.5 mln ha) and Afghanistan (0.4 mln ha).
Table 3. Agricultural data by country and crop [28].
Country Crop Yield(tons/Ha)
Cost
($US/Ha)
Water Requirements
(m3/ha/Year)
Total Land Area in Production within
the Amu Darya Basin (Million Ha)
Tajikistan
cotton 1.8 444 12
0.5wheat 1.5 168 8
vegetable 12 500 12
Afghanistan
cotton 1.8 444 12
0.4wheat 1.6 165 8
potato 12 503 12
Uzbekistan
cotton 2.3 390 14
2.3wheat 1.5 283 6
vegetable 11 702 11
Turkmenistan
cotton 2.2 392 14
1.1wheat 1.5 283 6
vegetable 11 702 11
Melting of the snow originates from the water volume of the Amu Darya where the largest supply of
water is observed during summer making it accessible for irrigation purposes. When the water reaches
Nukus (Uzbekistan) via the deserts of Turkmenistan, 7 km3 of water gets evaporated. In general, the basin
consumes 78.46 km3 of water annually (Table 4) [10].
Water withdrawal in the basin increased to 107 km3 in 2006 and most of the water (96 km3) was
spent for irrigation purposes [29]. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are dominant users of the Amu Darya.
The alarming point is that the ASB has very high water withdrawal per irrigated hectare—up to 14,000 m3/ha,
which is a consequence of inefficient water management in dry areas [28].
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Table 4. Mean annual runoff in the Aral Sea basin (km3/year) [10].
Country River Basin Total Aral Sea Basin
Syr Darya Amu Darya Tedzhen-Murghab km3 %
Kazakhstan 3.3 3.3 2.8
Kyrgyzstan 27.42 1.93 29.35 24.8
Tajikistan 1.01 59.45 60.46 51
Turkmenistan 0.68 0.3 0.98 0.8
Uzbekistan 4.84 4.7 9.54 8.1
Afghanistan 11.7 3.1 14.8 12.5
Aral Sea basin 36.57 78.46 3.4 118.43 100
The performance indicators of the irrigation depend on the conveying canals as well. For example,
Niyazov canal in Turkmenistan, the world’s longest irrigation canal, can deliver up to 20 km3 of water
from Amu Darya to the western part of Turkmenistan. This canal is one of the key reasons behind the
inefficient discharge of water from the Amu Darya as high water evaporation is observed in the delivery
process over 1375 km in the Karakum desert [10]. This canal was constructed in the 1950s and its inlet
to Amu Darya is located at the border of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Karakum canal is an integrated
water resource management system consisting of Amu Darya, Murghab and Tedzhen rivers heading to
Ashgabat for irrigation (1.2 million ha) and consumption purposes [30].
Current challenges will likely be aggravated by emerging problems—in particular, climate change.
The Central Asian region is warming faster than the global average, and climate change will hit the region
sooner and harder [31]. In addition, it is calculated that 7.5 million Uzbeks, 4.8 million Tajiks, 2 million
Kyrgyz and 1.5 million Turkmens lack access to safe drinking water [32].
4. Managing Challenges and Leveraging Opportunities: Integrating WEF Nexus Elements
The management of transboundary water resources during the Soviet Union reveals the existence of a
benefit-sharing mechanism. On the other hand, water was stored upstream until release for irrigation
downstream during the summer period; on the other hand, fossil fuels were traded upstream during
the winter period. Surplus hydropower was released to the Central Asian Power System. To some
extent, a normative regulation and institutional guidelines were in place through imposition by the Soviet
Union [33]. From an institutional point of view, the Soviet Union was instrumental to supervise and
frame transboundary water resources management and to define a system where the release of water was
negotiated and defined following interests of both upstream and downstream countries.
However, the unilateral development approach dominated over the communism principles with the
breakdown of regional cooperation in the 1990s [3]. This reason persuades authors to think that a high level
of securitization in the region is considered an obstacle against synergizing WEF nexus opportunities in the
region. Another approach can be improving livelihoods through market mechanisms with a sustainable
supply of water, energy and agriculture.
So far, many aims of nexus approaches have encountered significant barriers to progress, including
challenges to cross-disciplinary collaboration, complexity, the political economy and the incompatibility
of current institutional structures [21]. Due to these interdependencies, local authorities cannot fully
cover synergies and trade-offs of the WEF nexus in long- and short-term periods [34]. Since the Amu
Darya is a main contributor to the Aral Sea basin, today it shows real evidence for WEF tensions in the
region. The history of the situation goes back to the Soviet period where all decisions were centrally
made from Moscow, leading to irrational decisions on sharing water both for hydropower and agriculture
purposes [35].
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The benefit-sharing theory in transboundary water resources management and development explain
that countries establish partnership if the net advantage of collaboration is higher than the net advantage
of non-collaboration [36]. To make a holistic evaluation of hurdles and cooperation opportunities,
SWOT analysis is conducted (Table 5) to provide the real scenario of influencing internal and external
factors. From a strategic point of view, SWOT (strength, weakness, opportunity, threats) analysis for the
nexus helps to identify priorities for nationalization or integration in Central Asia. Positive and negative
sides of nexus integration form the strategic position of ASB countries in the global arena.
Table 5. Strength, weakness, opportunity, threats (SWOT) analysis for Water–Food–Energy (WEF)
integration in Central Asia water management.
Strengths Weaknesses
1 maximzing net benefit sharing among CAcountries [36] 1
Upstream countries export less hydro
energy that might lead to decrease in
revenue generated [2]
2 decreasing deficit of agriculture in TAJ andKYR [37] 2
shortage of water/energy in upstream
when it is released to downstream in
spring/summer [10]
3 decreasing deficit of water and energy inKAZ, UZB, TKM [10] 3
downstream countries cannot export fossil
fuel to China/Russia when natural
resources are shared in between CA
countries [14]
4 sustainable and equal sharing oftransboundary resources [22] 4
Upstream cannot supply hydropower for
its heating during the winter period [38]
5
promoting economic growth, strengthen
social ties, political integration,
demographic development [3]
5
Downstream countries would need to sell
fossil fuel to upstream countries at
discounted prices for heating purposes in
the winter period [35,39]
Opportunity Threats
1 the maximizing economic benefit oftransboundary natural resources [36] 1
Weakening political/economic ties with key
partner countries: China, Russia, United
States [29]
2 Opportunity to mitigate negativeconsequences of climate change in ASB [12] 2
Change in political relations with far
neighbors in the Caspian Sea basin, Far
East, Balkans [14,40]
3
Strong political, economic, social,
demographic, technological integration in
Central Asia [3]
3 Nationalism policies of each CA countriesweaken after regional integration [41]
4
A single unified network of sharing water
and energy resources as it was in the Soviet
Union [33]
4
Change in export/import, trade balance,
public debt, currency
appreciation/depreciation of each CA
country [42]
5
Integrated CA can help to solve the
political/economic problems in
Afghanistan [39]
5
High resource interdependence among CA
countries leads to less political will to
cooperate with eastern and western
neighbors [6]
Slow industrial and agricultural reforms, an absence of regional cooperation, and poor institutional
development led to a crisis in the WEF nexus [4]. In spite of political disconnection in Central Asia,
regional dynamics are further problematic influenced by the global political economy. If we analyze
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from a neutral perspective, there is no shortage of water and energy resources in Central Asia. All of the
WEF-nexus-related challenges are the result of poor market structure, diplomacy and governance in the
region [14]. Regardless of having a strong resource reserve, most of the CA countries are still listed among
the least developing countries.
Considering that upstream countries (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan) are rich in water and energy resources and
downstream countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) have economies of scale on agriculture, each community
calculates the benefits of acting alone compared to the benefits of various cooperation strategies in
the transboundary basin [3,43]. One of the most pressing challenges is to organize the political and
administrative cooperation among CA countries to finance the large-scale investments to alter the
allocation of water in the basin among locations, sectors and crops [16].
If the energy production is maximized at Rogun and Dastijum Reservoirs, the economic benefits to all
four countries could increase in supporting irrigated agriculture for both normal and drought conditions.
In general, two dams can increase the water volume from autumn until spring, making the water mischarge
available for summer irrigation in downstream countries [16]. However, upstream countries have interest
to use this water discharge for hydropower purposes when the electricity production is maximized.
This conflict of interests requires careful and conscious political negotiations among CA stakeholders on
the working environment [16]. If the upstream countries are jealous of water, they are able to generate the
electricity at the expense of irrigation of downstream economies leading to again growing conflict when
food shortage occurs in the region.
Another associated problem is the poor entrustment and loyalty in the region. Mainly, the absence of
data exchange prevented the initiation of a hydro-meteorological system that could guarantee rational
resource allocation in the region. Whilst other platforms are working for data exchange, reliable information
about the environment and, in particular, water resources is not currently available in a consolidated and
credible platform [35].
The irrigation networks of Central Asia were largely built between 1950s–80s without any significant
upgrading in the last years. It is hard to believe that half of the water is lost before reaching the final
destination due to worsening irrigation networks and an increasing evaporation rate [44].
Tajikistan can strengthen its energy potential via cutting the irrigation sector of downstream neighbors.
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan demand water for agriculture mostly in summer, but Tajikistan has an
interest in releasing water in winter [45]. In this case, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan would need to sacrifice
cotton plantations [46] where most of the population is employed [47].
5. Conclusions: From Conflict to Cooperation
This paper conducted meta-analysis with the perspective of bringing more water to the final
destination—the Aral Sea—and synergizing the water–energy–food nexus among CA countries as a
solution to mitigate the negative consequences of climate change, environmental catastrophe in Central
Asia and even globally. In order to bring more water reachable to the Aral Sea towards mitigating climate
change in the basin, the following suggestions can be derived:
a. Synergizing the water–energy–food nexus is urgently needed to foster cooperation among CA
countries and lead to effective resource management in the region.
b. The qualitative performance of inter-governmental organizations can be an essential element for
supervision and guidance of the neighboring CA countries in distributing water, energy and food of
respecting countries.
c. The energy focus of upstream countries and the agriculture interest of downstream countries are
main reasons behind reinforced collaboration, regional integration and even political tensions in
the region.
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On its turn, to mitigate water–energy–food nexus conflicts in Central Asia, the following
recommendations are provided by [2]:
i. As planned, Rogun can be used for energy purposes, while Nurek considers the irrigation interests of
the neighboring countries. With this approach, Tajikistan will fully cover its electricity consumption
and irrigation will also be maintained in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.
ii. Alternatively, the Soviet-period scenario can be rehabilitated—that is, upstream countries provide
required water in summer for irrigation and downstream countries supply natural resources (oil,
coal, gas) in return to meet the energy demand of upstream economies during the winter period.
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